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Tying Together the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes:
What Is the Proper Tax Treatment of
Abandonments in Bankruptcy?
I. INTRODUCTION
To many people, the Internal Revenue Code' and the Bankruptcy Code
are quite separate and distinct. In law school, the tax and bankruptcy courses
are taught separately, and there are very few, if any, overlapping issues
discussed in the courses. In the real world, however, things are not so simple
and discreet. Tax issues are often, or should be, the driving factor in many
bankruptcy decisions. Many debtors, trustees in bankruptcy, and even lawyers
fail to consider the profound effect that taxation may have in a bankruptcy
situation. Taxation affects not only the debtor filing for bankruptcy relief but
also the unsecured creditors.
Unfortunately, the answers to many bankruptcy-tax questions are not to be
found in either of the Codes. In some cases, the two Codes provide opposite
answers. Congress attempted to address this problem with the Bankruptcy Tax
Act in 1980.3 While this Act resolved many issues regarding the reconciliation
of the two Codes, the income tax consequences of the transfer of fully
encumbered property between the debtor and the bankruptcy estate still present
a difficult issue for the individual debtor, the trustee, the creditor, and the
Internal Revenue Service. This Comment addresses the tax treatment of a
specific type of transfer-abandonment of property by a trustee in bankruptcy
back to a debtor. 4
To illustrate the situation, suppose that Mary has recently had financial
difficulty. She already took out a second mortgage on her house, so that now
her house is fully encumbered. Unfortunately, even the money that Mary
received from the second mortgage could not help her fully recover from her
financial slump. As a result, Mary contacted an attorney and filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Immediately upon filing the
bankruptcy petition, all of Mary's property was automatically transferred to an
entity known as a bankruptcy estate,5 which is administered by a trustee in
bankruptcy.
1 I.R.C. §§ 1-9602 (1988).
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
3 Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, I.R.C §§ 1398-1399 (1988).
4 The discussion of the tax issues contained in this Comment has not been affected by
the Reconciliation Act of 1993. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
5 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
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The trustee, upon taking an "inventory" of the property of the estate,
decides that Mary's house is worthless to the estate, because it is fully
encumbered. That means that the trustee could spend a considerable amount of
time and money trying to sell the house only to get nothing out of it for the
estate (i.e., for the unsecured creditors); any money received from the sale
would go to the mortgagees to pay off the two mortgages on the house. So, the
trustee decides to abandon the property back to Mary. Does this abandonment
constitute a "sale or exchange" upon which the estate is taxed? Mary would
like the estate to bear the tax burden so that she will not have to pay it when
she later disposes of the property. The trustee, on the other hand, abandoned
the property so that the estate could avoid spending the money to liquidate it-
only to have the estate incur a tax liability with regard to the property.
This situation is certainly not atypical. Debtors in financial trouble often
have property that is fully or over encumbered. Trustees in bankruptcy
commonly react by abandoning the property, but the tax consequences of such
a decision are far from certain. How can a debtor or a trustee in bankruptcy
effectively plan for the tax consequences of an abandonment in the midst of
such uncertainty?
This Comment attempts to address some of these concerns. First, this
Comment provides a general overview of the taxation of individuals in
bankruptcy, including the creation of a separate taxable bankruptcy estate, the
tax consequences of discharge of indebtedness, and the tax treatment of
dispositions of property in general. Second, this Comment looks at the tax
implications of abandonment by a trustee in bankruptcy. In doing so, it
analyzes the two opposing theories regarding the taxation of abandonments-
the entrapment theory and the deflection theory. Finally, this Comment
discusses the proper tax treatment of abandonments, adopting a middle
approach that not only deals with the problems inherent in the two opposing
theories but also attempts to reconcile the two Codes.
IH. TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS iN BANKRUPTCY IN GENERAL
A. Creation of a Separate Taxable Bankruptcy Estate
To understand the tax issues raised by abandonments, it is necessary to
analyze the basic tax treatment of the transactions involved in bankruptcy and
how the relevant Bankruptcy Code and Internal Revenue Code sections apply to
those transactions.
The filing of a petition in bankruptcy creates an estate consisting of all
legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
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of the case.6 A separate estate is created for bankruptcy law purposes
regardless of whether the debtor is an individual, a corporation, or a
partnership. However, for tax law purposes, the bankruptcy estate is treated as
a separate taxable entity only for individuals filing under Chapter 7 (relating to
liquidations) or Chapter 11 (relating to reorganizations) of the Bankruptcy
Code.7 No separate taxable entity is created when either corporations or
partnerships file for bankruptcy.8 Because of the lack of a separate taxable
entity for corporations and partnerships, the problem of abandonments
discussed in this Comment applies only to individuals in Chapter 7 or Chapter
11 proceedings.
The filing of the bankruptcy petition also operates as an automatic stay. 9
The automatic stay prevents all creditors from attempting to satisfy their claims
against either the debtor or the estate.
Section 1398 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "[a] transfer
(other than by sale or exchange) of an asset from the debtor to the estate [at the
commencement of the bankruptcy case] shall not be treated as a disposition for
purposes of any provision of this title assigning tax consequences to a
disposition .... -o This language implies that transfers that do constitute sales
or exchanges are treated as taxable dispositions. It is quite conceivable that the
transfer of encumbered property from the debtor to the estate upon
commencement of the bankruptcy case could constitute a sale or exchange. As
such, it would be excepted from the tax-free treatment of section 1398.11
However, it seems unlikely that Congress intended transfers of encumbered
property that occur by operation of law at the inception of a bankruptcy case to
trigger recognition of gain or loss to the debtor.12
6 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). It is generally held that title to all of the debtor's
property vests in the bankruptcy estate upon commencement of the case. See, e.g., In re
Robison, 74 B.R. 646, 647 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
7 I.R.C. § 1398(a) (1988).
8 Id. § 1399.
9 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
10 I.R.C. § 1398(f(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
I1 See, e.g., In re Rasmussen, 95 B.R. 657, 658-59 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding
that debtors' transfer of property to their bankruptcy estate in return for discharge of debts
constituted an exchange for tax purposes).
12 In fact, nonrecognition of gains or losses on such transfers appears to be universally
accepted. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-134, 1978-1 C.B. 197; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-17-075 (Apr.
27, 1990); Martin S. Allen, Selected Tax Considerations in Workouts and Bankruptcies, in
REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES 1992, at 119 (PLI Real Estate and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 379, 1992); Ray D. Madoff, 77w Tax Consequences of
Bankruptcy, in TAX ASPECTS OF WORKOUTS, INSOLVENCY, AND BANKRUPTCY 1991, at 249
(ALI-ABA Course of Study Series No. c701, 1991); Richard C. Onsager, Assigning Tax
1993]
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Consistent with the succession by the estate to the debtor's assets upon the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, the Internal Revenue Code also
provides that the estate succeeds to the following tax attributes of the debtor:
(1) net operating loss carryovers, (2) charitable contributions carryovers, (3)
recovery of tax benefit items, (4) credit carryovers, (5) capital loss carryovers,
(6) basis, holding period, and character of assets, (7) method of accounting,
and (8) other tax attributes as provided in the regulations. 13
As with transfers at the commencement of the bankruptcy case, the Internal
Revenue Code provides that, in general, transfers from the estate back to the
debtor at the termination of the estate are not treated as dispositions for tax
purposes. 14 In addition, the Internal Revenue Code provides for the return of
unused tax attributes from the estate to the debtor at the termination of the
estate.15
B. Tax Implications to Debtor of Discharge of Indebtedness and
Dispositions of Property
1. Discharge of Indebtedness-Section 108
Nearly everyone has debts, whether they are credit card debts, home
mortgages, or student loans. Few would complain if their creditors were to call
and tell them that they no longer owed anything-that their creditors were
Liability Between the Bankruptcy Estate and the Individual Debtor, 75 J. TAX'N 102, 102
(1991). What constitutes a sale or exchange for tax purposes will be discussed in further
detail. See discussion infra part LB.2.b.
13 I.R.C. § 1398(g) (1988). On November 9, 1992, proposed regulations under
§ 1398 were issued. The proposed regulations provide for the succession by the estate of
two additional tax attributes-passive activity losses and losses suspended under the at-risk
rules of§ 465. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1(c), -2(c), 57 Fed. Reg. 53300-02 (1992).
These regulations have helped to clarify the substantial uncertainty created by § 1398
for the bankruptcies of individuals owning rental real estate and other properties subject to
the passive loss and at-risk rules. Richard M. Lipton, Proposed 1398 Regs. Raise Conflict
Between Debtors and Bankruptcy Trustees, 79 J. TAX'N 12 (1993). In this article, the
author noted that the court in In re Antonelli, 150 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992), held that
absent regulations under § 1398(g), a debtor's passive losses would not be transferred to the
bankruptcy estate. Lipton, supra, at 13. The Internal Revenue Service subsequently
followed this holding. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-04-008 (Oct. 27, 1992). The author then
commended the Service "for correcting the two most glaring omissions in Section 1398(g)."
Lipton, supra, at 13.
14 I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 136-38, 149-50 for a
discussion of what is meant by the phrase "termination of the estate."
15 Id. § 1398(1).
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simply canceling their debt. However, such a generous act may carry with it
some not-so-generous tax consequences.
In general, a cancellation of a debt occurs when a creditor accepts less than
the unpaid balance of the debt in complete satisfaction of the liability, or when
a creditor simply cancels the debt. A taxpayer does not realize income when
money is borrowed, because there is an offsetting obligation to repay the
amount.' 6 However, if the taxpayer is not required to repay the borrowed
money, which relieves the borrower of an outstanding liability, ordinary
income will result.' 7 The taxpayer is, in effect, being treated as having received
money directly from the creditor.
Section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that, in certain
circumstances, a taxpayer may exclude from gross income that income arising
from discharge of indebtedness. 18 The most relevant exception for purposes of
this Comment is the one that excludes discharge of indebtedness income if the
discharge occurs in a Title 11 bankruptcy case. 19
There is, however, a price to pay for the section 108 exclusion. The debtor
must reduce certain tax attributes to the extent that discharge of indebtedness
income is excluded. 20 The debtor may, however, elect to reduce first the basis
16 J. MARTIN BuRKE & MICHA-L K. FRmL, TAXATION OF INDIVMuAL INcoME 54 (2d
ed. 1992); William J. Rohrbach, Jr., The Disposition of Properties Secured by Recourse and
Nonrecourse Debt, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 231, 250 (1989).
17 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1988). "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items: . . . [i]ncome from discharge of indebtedness[.]" Id.; see also United
States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931) (holding that discharge of indebtedness
income arose when a corporation repurchased its own bonds for an amount less than the
price for which it sold those bonds).
18 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1) (1988).
19 Id. § 108(a)(1)(A).
20 Id. § 108(b)(1). Tax attributes are to be reduced in the following order:
(1) the net operating loss and any net operating loss carryover for the
taxable year of discharge,
(2) any carryover of the general business credit under § 38,
(3) the net capital loss and any net capital loss carryover for the taxable
year of discharge under § 1212,
(4) the basis of the taxpayer's assets,
(5) foreign tax credit carryovers.
Id. § 108(b)(2). A debtor may not reduce the basis in assets below the amount of any
remaining undischarged liabilities. Id. § 1017(b)(2).
The tax attribute reductions are made after the determination of the tax for the
taxable year of discharge. Id. § 108(b)(4)(A). The effect of this provision is to allow the
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in depreciable property.2 1 This election provides flexibility to the debtor to
account for discharge of indebtedness income in the most favorable manner.
For example, a debtor who wishes to retain net operating losses and other
carryovers may elect instead to reduce the basis in depreciable assets.
Conversely, a debtor who has a net operating loss that is about to expire may
apply discharge of indebtedness income first to reduce the net operating loss
that would otherwise be wasted. 22
The timing of the tax attribute reduction provides the debtor another
opportunity to engage in some tax planning. Tax attributes are reduced after the
debtor calculates the tax liability for the year in which the debt is forgiven.23
Thus, the reduction in tax attributes that is required by a debt reduction will not
adversely affect gains on sales that occur during the same year as the debt
reduction. The debtor can, therefore, sell property during the year of the debt
reduction and use the full value of the net operating losses, tax basis, and the
like to offset any gain realized.
Thus, section 108 does not permanently exclude income, but rather permits
a taxpayer, in effect, to defer the discharge of indebtedness income by reducing
various tax attributes. In doing so, this provision helps to reconcile the
purposes of the Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code. First, it helps
to preserve the debtor's fresh start after bankruptcy by not burdening him with
immediate tax liability. Second, it helps to preserve the government's interest
in collecting tax revenue by merely deferring, not eliminating, the recognition
of discharge of indebtedness income.24
taxpayer to utilize existing attributes for transactions occurring in the year in which the
benefit of § 108 is claimed.
21 Id. § 108(b)(5). Unlike the limitation placed on reduction of basis under § 108(b)(2),
§ 108(b)(5) permits a debtor to reduce the entire basis of depreciable property, but not
below zero. Id. §§ 108(b)(5)(B), 1017(b)(2). Any discharge of indebtedness income
remaining after the debtor's basis in depreciable property is reduced to zero must be applied
to reduce the tax attributes in the order provided in § 108(b)(2). See id. § 108(b)(5)(C).
22 S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7017, 7025; H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980).
23 I.R.C. § 108(b)(4)(A) (1988).
24 S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 22, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7025;
H.R. REP. No. 833, supra note 22, at 9.
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2. Dispositions of Encunbered Property
a. Tax Treatment of Dispositions in General
Debt may also be discharged in connection with the transfer of all or a
portion of the debtor's property from the debtor to the creditor by foreclosure
or by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Such a transfer is generally treated as a
taxable sale.25 The gain from such a sale is equal to the excess of the amount
realized over the adjusted basis.26 The amount realized is equal to the sum of
any money received plus the fair market value of property received. 27 The
amount realized also includes all liabilities from which the debtor is relieved as
a result of the transfer, but does not include amounts that would be treated as
discharge of indebtedness income.28 The calculation of the amount realized
depends on whether the debt securing the property transferred is recourse (i.e.,
one for which the debtor is personally liable) or nonrecourse (i.e., one for
which the debtor is not personally liable).
If the debt is recourse, the regulations adopt a bifurcated approach. The
gain is measured by the difference between the property's adjusted basis and its
fair market value. If the amount of recourse debt exceeds the fair market value
of the property, and the debtor is relieved of a personal obligation by
transferring the property, then the difference between the amount of the debt
and the fair market value of the property is treated as discharge of indebtedness
income.29 This bifurcated approach may be preferable to the debtor in
bankruptcy, because recognition of at least part of the gain realized from the
transfer of the property may be deferred under section 108 of the Internal
Revenue Code.30 In addition, if the property transferred qualifies as a capital
asset, the debtor may benefit from capital gain treatment of the remainder of
the gain realized. 31
25 I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 36-44.
26 Id. § 1001(a).
27 Id. § 1001(b).
28 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (1980).
29 Id. § 1.1001-2(a)(2), (c), Example 8. The IRS has confirmed the appropriateness of
this bifurcated approach. Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-1 C.B. 12.
30 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
31 See Timothy A. Larason, Even Insolvent Taxpayers Have Income When Property is
Abandoned, 45 TAX'N FOR Accr. 88, 89 (1990) (stating that one could imply from the fact
that the Senate Report to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 specifically precludes the
possibility of converting the excluded discharge of indebtedness income from ordinary
income to capital gain that any income that would otherwise be treated as capital gain would
not qualify for the exclusion). See I.R.C. § 1221 for the definition of a capital asset.
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If, on the other hand, the debt is nonrecourse, the entire amount of the
indebtedness discharged in return for the foreclosure of the property securing
the indebtedness is treated as amount realized.32 This treatment is mandated
even if the fair market value of the property is less than the amount of the
indebtedness. 33 Thus, none of the gain is treated as discharge of indebtedness
income. It may, however, be possible to bifurcate the transaction itself into two
steps: "(i) forgiveness of a portion of the indebtedness without consideration
and (ii) a subsequent satisfaction of the remainder of the indebtedness by the
transfer of the property." 34 It may also be possible to convert the nonrecourse
debt into recourse debt before transferring the property so that the bifurcation
approach to recourse debt applies.35
b. Case Law Characterizing Dispositions
At this point, a discussion of the case law relevant to the taxation of
dispositions and the definition of what constitutes a disposition for tax purposes
is helpful.36
When a debtor sells property encumbered by a recourse obligation and the
purchaser assumes this obligation, it is generally held that the total amount of
the obligation assumed is included in the debtor's amount realized. 37 This
treatment is required because the debtor receives a benefit to the extent the
debtor is relieved of a personal obligation to pay money. 38
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(i) (1980).
33 Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c),
Example 7 (1980).
34 Roger M. Ritt & Robert D. Burke, Selected Tax Issues in Workouts and
Bankruptcies: Debt Forgiveness, Foreclosures, and Modifications, in TAX AND BUSINESS
PLANNING 1991, at 171 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Series No. c605, 1991); see also
Michael G. Frankel, Tax Planning for Troubled Real Estate and Partnership Transactions-
Part 2, 20 J. REAL EST. TAx'N 6, 7 (1992).
35 Frankel, supra note 34, at 10; Ritt & Burke, supra note 34, at 175.
36 See Rohrbach, supra note 16, at 234-44 (discussing Crane v. Commissioner and its
progeny at length). It is important to note that the cases discussed in this section involved
dispositions in nonbankruptcy situations. They will, however, be relevant to the discussion
of whether abandonment in bankruptcy is a taxable disposition. See discussion infra part
llI.C.l.c.
37 See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 13 (1947). This necessarily affects the
amount of the gain realized by the debtor. Keeping the basis constant, the higher the
amount realized, the higher the gain will be. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying
text.
38 Crane, 331 U.S. at 13.
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The Supreme Court has consistently held that a liability of a seller,
assumed by a purchaser, is included in the seller's amount realized-even when
the liability is nonrecours0 9 and even when the amount of the nonrecourse
liability exceeds the fair market value of the property sold. 40 In each case, the
Supreme Court based its finding on the fact that the seller received a benefit by
being relieved of the liability. 41
Other cases have held that there need not be a voluntary sale and
assumption of a liability for this analysis to apply. Relief from a liability in an
involuntary foreclosure sale,42 a reconveyance of property back to the creditor
in satisfaction of the debt, 43 and abandonment of property44 have all been held
to sufficiently benefit the debtor so as to give rise to an amount realized.
c. Effect of Bankruptcy on Who Bears the Burden of the Tax
Whether the estate or the debtor is to be liable for the payment of taxes on
the sale of property before or during the bankruptcy case can have a dramatic
impact on the debtor, the unsecured creditors, the trustee in bankruptcy, and
the Internal Revenue Service. If a creditor forecloses on the debtor's property
before the bankruptcy petition is filed, the transaction is treated just like any
other nonbankruptcy transfer and, therefore, is taxable to the debtor. This tax
will most likely be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 45 If, however, the creditor
forecloses on the property after the debtor files for bankruptcy, the estate will
be liable for the tax on any gain.46 This tax will be an administrative expense47
39 Id. at 14.
40 Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983).
41 Id. at 312; Crane, 331 U.S. at 14.
42 Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
43 Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); see also Millar v. Commissioner,
577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that a surrender of stock in exchange for cancellation
of indebtedness resulted in realization of taxable gains); Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B.
264.
44 Yarbro v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1189 (1985); see also Middleton v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 124 (1lth Cir. 1982) (holding
that when owners volunteered to deed property subject to nonrecourse debt back to the
mortgagee, such action resulted in abandonment of property, which constituted a sale or
exchange). Note that both of these cases dealt with nonbankruptcy abandonments.
45 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1988). Only if the tax was last due more than 3 years before
the petition date or assessed more than 240 days before the petition date, will the tax be
dischargeable to the debtor. Id. §§ 523(a)(1)(A), 507(a)(7)(A)(i)-(fii).
46 Section 1398 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "[tihe gross income of the
estate for each taxable year shall include the gross income of the debtor to which the estate
is entitled under title 11 of the United States Code." I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis
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and will be given first priority over other unsecured claims. 48 The debtor will
not be liable for any deficiency if the estate's assets are insufficient to cover
administrative expenses. 49
How do these results affect the parties involved?50 First, the debtor will
have a strong interest in ensuring that the estate is liable for the taxes. If the
debtor is liable for the taxes, the debtor will probably emerge from the
bankruptcy with a significant nondischargeable debt to the Internal Revenue
Service, which, of course, severely limits the "fresh start" purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code. 51
Second, by treating gains taxable to the estate as a first priority
administrative expense, funds available to pay unsecured creditors are
significantly reduced. This severely limits a countervailing purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code-to protect private, voluntary, unsecured creditors. 52 The
unsecured creditors will thus have a strong interest in avoiding any sale taxable
to the estate.
Third, the trustee in bankruptcy also has an interest in keeping
administrative tax expenses at a minimum. The trustee's fees are also
added). Because the estate is a separate taxable entity, and the estate itself made the
transfer, it is entitled to the income from the transfer and, therefore, liable for any tax on
such income. See also Frankel, supra note 34, at 39-40; Mark A. Wallace, Is a Midstream
Abandonment of Property by a Bankruptcy Trustee Taxable to the Estate?, 77 J. TAx'N 26,
26 (1992).
47 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (1988). But see infra text accompanying notes 108-16.
48 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988).
49 This result is implied from the fact that 11 U.S.C. § 523 does not except
administrative expenses from discharge. Taxes incurred by the estate in the administration
of its property (such as when a creditor forecloses on the property in the hands of the estate)
are classified as administrative expenses, not taxes, for purposes of § 523 (discharge) and §
507 (priorities).
50 This analysis of the interests of, and the effects on, the parties applies equally to the
taxation of abandonments in bankruptcy.
51 See, e.g., In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1073 (1984); In re Sinder, 102 B.R. 978, 989 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re
Weatherspoon, 101 B.R. 533, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1989) (citing Lines v. Frederick, 400
U.S. 18, 19 (1970)); In re Laymon, No. 6-89-235, 1989 WL 252447 (D. Minn. July 25,
1989); S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 22, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7025
(1980); H.R. REP. No. 833, supra note 22, at 9; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
13-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5799.
52 S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5800;
see also Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 815, 824-28 (1987) (arguing that placing additional burdens
on creditors in bankruptcy invites troublesome forum shopping, with creditors seeking to
enforce their claims in a nonbankruptcy setting).
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administrative expenses; as such, they are afforded the same priority as taxes. 53
The trustee will not want to reduce the amount available to pay these fees by
engaging in taxable transactions on behalf of the estate. In addition, the trustee
may remain personally liable for tax liabilities of the estate that remain
unpaid.54
Finally, the Internal Revenue Service has certain interests, somewhat
different from those of the other parties, which must be protected. The tax
system works only to the extent that taxpayers think it is fair. The integrity of
the tax system, therefore, must not be jeopardized by permitting taxpayers to
use bankruptcy as a means of improperly avoiding their tax debts and placing
the burden of making up the lost revenues on other taxpayers. 55
IlH. TAX IMPLICATIONS OF ABANDONMENT
A. The Trustee's Right to Abandon
The Bankruptcy Code grants a trustee the authority to abandon an asset
"that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit
to the estate." 56 A trustee is most likely to abandon property if the mortgage
securing it exceeds the fair market value of the property. This property may be
abandoned to any party with a possessory interest.57
The legislative history to section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code is silent as to
the purpose of the abandonment provision. Judges and commentators, however,
have suggested that the purposes behind the abandonment provision are
maximization of the estate for distribution to parties in interest and expeditious
reduction of the debtor's property to money for such distribution. 58
53 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
54 Treas. Reg. § 301.6871(a)-2(c) (1967); Madoff, supra note 12.
55 S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5800. In
the case of bankruptcy, the unsecured creditors bear the burden of making up the lost
revenues.
56 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
57 S. REp. No. 989, supra note 51, at 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5878;
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963.
58 In re Terjen, 154 B.R. 456, 458 (E.D. Va. 1993); In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652, 654
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1991); In re Olson, 121 B.R. 346, 348 (N.D. Iowa 1990), aft'd, 930 F.2d
6 (8th Cir. 1991); M. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRupTcY REORGANIZATION 340 (1987); L. KING,
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUpTcY 554.01 (15th ed. 1985).
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B. The Tax Issue
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 59 and its legislative history6° are silent
with regard to the tax treatment of abandonments in bankruptcy. The Act does
state that transfers from the estate to the debtor (other than by sale or exchange)
at the termination of the estate are free from tax consequences. 61 However, it is
not clear whether the phrase, "at the termination of the estate," was intended
by Congress to apply to midstream abandonments of property by a trustee in
bankruptcy. 62 As a result, determination of the applicability of this section has
been left to judicial interpretation. Two specific issues must be addressed in
determining whether an abandonment of property by a trustee in bankruptcy is
taxable to the estate or to the debtor upon subsequent disposition of the
property. These are as follows: (1) whether section 1398(f)(2), with its
"termination of the estate" language, applies to abandonments during
bankruptcy, and (2) whether abandonments themselves constitute sales or
exchanges of the property, which would take them out of the purview of
section 1398(f)(2) and give rise to taxable income. These issues will be
addressed in conjunction with an analysis of the opposing theories regarding
the taxation of abandonments in bankruptcy.
59 I.R.C. §§ 1398-1399 (1988).
60 S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 22, at 28-32, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
7045; H.R. REP. No. 833, supra note 22, at 23-27.
61 I.R.C. § 1398(0(2) (1988).
62 Compare In re Olson, 100 B.R. 458, 463 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989), af'd, 121 B.R.
346 (N.D. Iowa 1990), aft'd, 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the court could see no
reason why abandonment during bankruptcy should have a different tax effect) and In re
McGowan, 95 B.R. 104, 107 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (holding that "termination of the
estate" includes the termination of the estate's interest in property by abandonment) with In
re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 273 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (rejecting the reasoning of
the McGowan and Olson courts) and Bradley J. Nelson, Taxation of Abandonments in
Bankruptcy, 10 1. AGRic. TAX'N & LAW 221, 226 (1988) (stating that "termination of the
estate" clearly excludes abandonments).
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C. Analysis of the Opposing Theories and Case Law
1. The Entrapment Theory
a. A Look at the Theory Itself
Under the entrapment theory, the abandonment is considered a taxable
event triggering gain or loss, thereby "trapping" the tax in the estate. 63 The
result of this entrapment is that the bankruptcy estate incurs a substantial tax
liability64 and the debtor receives a stepped-up basis (i.e., fair market value) in
the property when it is abandoned. Thus, if the creditor subsequently forecloses
upon the property, the debtor will realize little or no gain. 65
The Internal Revenue Code specifically provides that transfers into the
estate upon commencement of the bankruptcy case 66 and transfers out of the
estate upon termination of the estate67 are nontaxable events. However, the
Internal Revenue Code is silent as to whether either of these provisions was
intended to apply to abandonments of property during the administration of the
case. Thus, the theory concludes, absent a specific statutory exemption, the
general principles of tax law apply.68
There are four major premises upon which the entrapment theory relies. 69
First, the transfer of property from the debtor to the estate at the
commencement of the case is tax free and subject to the mortgage. If this
premise were to fail, the theory would not work for two reasons: (1) if the
transfer were not tax free, then the debtor would be taxed on any gain upon
commencement of the case, the estate would receive a stepped-up basis in the
property, and there would be no gain upon abandonment to trap in the estate;
and (2) if the transfer were not subject to the mortgage, then the estate would
receive no benefit (i.e., relief from the mortgage indebtedness) by abandoning
the property, and there could be no sale or exchange on which to justify taxing
the estate. According to the theory, the Internal Revenue Code expressly
63 See Nelson, supra note 62, at 226.
64 This tax liability may be classified as a first priority administrative expense. 11
U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(B)i), 507(a)(1) (1988). The significance of this classification will be
addressed later. See infra text accompanying notes 109-16.
65 This result follows from the fact that gain is calculated as the excess of amount
realized (theoretically, fair market value) over the debtor's adjusted basis (which, after the
abandonment, is also fair market value). I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
66 Id. § 1398(0(1).
67 Id. § 1398(0(2).
68 These principles are embodied in I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001.
69 Nelson, supra note 62, at 227-28.
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provides for nonrecognition of gain upon transfer from the debtor to the estate
at the commencement of the case. 70 In addition, the transfer to the estate is
subject to the mortgage, because the estate can only receive whatever interest
the debtor had in the property. 71 Because the property was subject to the
mortgage in the debtor's hands, it must also be subject to the mortgage in the
hands of the estate.
Second, the entrapment theory relies on the premise that upon the filing of
a bankruptcy petition, the value of the secured creditor's mortgage or lien is
stripped down to the fair market value of the property. Section 506 of the
Bankruptcy Code achieves this result.72 This section operates to secure the
creditor's mortgage only to the extent of the fair market value of the property
that is subject to it. Any amount that exceeds the fair market value of the
property is relegated to unsecured status. This premise is important because the
secured portion of the mortgage essentially attaches to the property-it is not a
personal debt; only the deficiency, or unsecured portion of the mortgage, may
be considered personal debt. Thus abandonment of the property by the trustee
in bankruptcy transfers not only the property but also the secured portion of the
mortgage, which benefits the estate by relieving it of that debt.73 The
unsecured portion remains with the estate to be paid out of any funds remaining
after all secured and priority claims are paid.
Third, the entrapment theory relies upon nonbankruptcy case law for the
proposition that an abandonment constitutes a taxable exchange. This
proposition rests on two major premises. First, the estate is relieved of the
secured portion of the debt when it abandons the property. This benefit is
sufficient to constitute an amount realized. 74 Second, the abandonment
constitutes an exchange for tax purposes: the estate is (1) giving legal title to
the property free and clear of the claims of unsecured creditors, (2) receiving a
relief from its obligations to pay the secured portion of the debt associated with
the property, and (3) there is a causal connection between the abandonment and
the relief from the obligation. 75
70 I.R.C. § 1398(1) (1988).
71 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
72 Id. § 506(a).
73 This result, it will be shown, is important for purposes of showing that the estate
incurs a taxable gain to the extent that its amount realized (i.e., its relief from the secured
debt) exceeds its adjusted basis. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
74 See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 312 (1983); Crane v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
75 This premise essentially applies the three-part definition of an "exchange." There
must be "a giving, a receipt, and a causal connection between the two." Yarbro v.
Commissioner, 737 F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
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Fourth, the entrapment theory dictates that this tax be given administrative
priority as an expense of the estate.76 This treatment is necessary so that the tax
does not pass out of the estate to the debtor at the termination of the case. The
purpose of the entrapment theory is to trap the tax in the estate, which relieves
the debtor of any tax liability resulting from the abandonment. If the tax
liability is given administrative priority, the debtor will not be liable for any
deficiency if the estate's assets are insufficient to cover administrative
expenses.77 If, on the other hand, the tax liability is not afforded administrative
priority, the debtor will remain liable, which undermines the purpose of the
entrapment theory.
b. The Case Law Supporting the Entrapment Theory
The main case that supports the entrapment theory is In re A.J. Lane &
Co. 78 In this case, one of the creditors had been granted relief from the
automatic stay and had scheduled foreclosure sales of the debtor's three
apartment complexes. The trustee filed a notice of intention to abandon these
properties to avoid the substantial income tax that would be incurred by the
estate upon foreclosure. 79 The court held that the abandonment constituted a
sale, taxable to the bankruptcy estate rather than the debtor. 80
In its reasoning, the court addressed three separate arguments. First, the
court reasoned that the abandonment constituted a taxable sale or exchange.
The court relied heavily on Yarbro v. Commissioner81 and held that because the
76 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(B)(i), 507(a)(1) (1988).
77 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
78 133 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991). The court in In re Rubin expressly adopted
the reasoning set forth in In re A.J. Lane. In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897, 899, 901 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1992). In In re Rubin, certain unsecured creditors sought to compel abandonment of
the debtor's partnership interest to avoid a court-approved settlement under which the
partnership would transfer certain property to one of its creditors in satisfaction of its claim
against the partnership. Because the gain from this transfer would pass through to the
partnership interest holders, the estate would incur a large gain. The court denied the
motion in part because under the reasoning of In re A.J. Lane, the estate could not escape
taxation by abandoning the property to the debtor. Id. at 901. For an explanation and
analysis of In re A.J. Lane, see Craig W. Friedrich, Tax Consequences Taken into Account
in Determining Whether to Allow Bankruptcy Trustee to "Abandon" Property, 20 J. REAL
EST. TAX'N 94 (1992); Wallace, supra note 46, at 27-30.
79 In re A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 266.
80 Id. at 275.
81 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that relief of an obligation to repay a
nonrecourse mortgage as a result of abandoning the property was sufficient to support a sale
or exchange).
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trustee conveyed property, and the estate was relieved of the secured portion of
the debt, the estate received a benefit from abandoning the property, and the
abandonment was taxable. It further noted that the facts of the present case
were even more compelling than those of Yarbro, because the foreclosure sale
was already scheduled to take place, whereas in Yarbro, the foreclosure sale
was likely but not yet in process.82
Second, the court reasoned that under Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co.,83 the trustee could not use the debtor as a mere conduit through which to
pass title and transfer property already the subject of a sales transaction. Such a
transfer would be for the sole purpose of having the debtor, rather than the
estate, taxed on the sale.84
Third, the court reasoned that abandonment does not escape taxation as a
transfer at "the termination of the estate."85 Section 1398(f)(2), providing that a
transfer from the estate to the debtor at the termination of the estate is tax free,
and section 1398(i), providing that the debtor succeeds to the tax attributes of
the estate upon termination of the estate, must be read in conjunction with each
other. Thus, the court reasoned, the statute anticipates a sort of symmetry: the
party holding the property, and therefore subject to the tax burden, is also the
one entitled to the tax attributes. 86 Because the estate still holds the tax
attributes upon abandonment of the property, the estate must be the taxable
entity.
Fourth, the court reasoned that taxing the debtor on the foreclosure
following the abandonment would create a clear burden on the debtor's fresh
start.87 The creditors would not be significantly prejudiced if the gain were
taxed to the estate, because the estate had inherited large net operating losses
from the debtor. Thus, the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code should
prevail. 88
82 In reA.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 271.
83 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (holding that a corporation cannot avoid taxation on a sale of
property by conveying that property to its shareholders and using them as a mere conduit
through which to pass title).
84 In re A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 271. The court's reliance on the Court Holding
doctrine could open the door to examination of the debtor's reasons for filing a bankruptcy
petition in the first place. In other words, the debtor could have filed for bankruptcy to use
the estate as a mere conduit through which to effectuate a pending foreclosure. That way
the tax liability could be transferred to the estate. Wallace, supra note 46, at 30.
85 I.R.C. § 1398(0(2) (1988).
86 In re A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 272.




c. Problems Inherent in the Entrapment Theory
There are several problems with the entrapment theory. The most serious
problem is that the theory completely ignores bankruptcy law. It seems simple
to conclude that absent a specific statutory exemption, the general principles of
tax law apply to characterize the tax effects of abandonments in bankruptcy.
However, one major point is forgotten: not only are we dealing with a tax
issue but we are also operating in a bankruptcy context. Therefore, both the
Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code must be considered before
arriving at a conclusion as to how to treat abandonments for tax purposes.
Under the Bankruptcy Tax Act, the estate is only responsible for gross
income of the debtor to which the estate is "entitled." 89 The problem is that
gross income to which the estate is entitled under the Bankruptcy Code is
different from a recognition event under the Internal Revenue Code. The
Internal Revenue Code requires recognition of a gain on appreciated property
when there is (1) a sale or other disposition, and (2) an amount realized by the,
taxpayer. 90 However, in a bankruptcy setting, the entitled requirement must
also be met.
What is meant by the term "entitled"? The term implies that one qualifies
for, or has proper grounds for claiming, a right or benefit. 91 Thus, it seems
that one must do something before one can qualify for any benefits flowing
from the action. It has been suggested that, in interpreting the entitled
language, courts must apply the same analysis that is used to determine whether
a tax has been "incurred by the estate" so as to be given administrative priority
under section 503(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.92 Applying this analysis, an
estate is entitled to gross income when the trustee "administers" the estate. 93 In
an abandonment, however, the trustee is not administering the estate.94
89 I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1) (1988).
90 Id. § 1001(a)-(b).
91 See BLACK'S LAwDICrIoNARY 532 (6th ed. 1991).
92 Todd Johnson, Note, Two Codes Collide: Is Abandoning Property by a Chapter 7
Trustee a Tax Recognition Event for the Bankruptcy Estate?, 14 J. CoRP. L. 687, 703-06
(1989).
93 Id.; see also S. REp. No. 989, supra note 51, at 66, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5852.
94 See 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1988) (stating that a trustee can either abandon or
administer the property); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 217 n.33 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1983) (stating that when property is abandoned by the trustee, any tax arising is not given
administrative priority, because it is not "incurred by the estate"); see also Larason, supra
note 31 (stating that the bankruptcy estate is not entitled to any income when there is an
abandonment).
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Therefore, the estate is not entitled to the income arising from the gain upon
abandonment and, as a result, is not responsible for the income under section
1398(e)(1).
Another problem with the entrapment theory is that if an abandonment is
treated as a sale or exchange, then consistency may mandate that similar
treatment be afforded to the transfer from the debtor to the estate at the
commencement of the case.95 To determine whether this transfer must also be
treated as a "sale or exchange," the Yarbro exchange analysis must be
applied. 96
At the commencement of the case, the debtor is giving legal title to the
bankruptcy estate. 97 But what is the debtor receiving? Arguably, the debtor is
receiving nothing. Commencement of bankruptcy constitutes an order for
relief.98 However, the debtor will receive no relief from indebtedness until the
date of the discharge at the close of the case. 99 Furthermore, there is the
possibility that the debtor's bankruptcy case may be dismissed, that the
bankruptcy court may deny a discharge, or that the trustee may abandon the
"property back to the debtor.100
An alternate characterization is that, because the property is transferred to
the estate subject to the mortgage, the debtor is being relieved of the obligation
to make mortgage payments and pay property taxes. 101 In effect, the debtor is
being relieved of any obligation that is to be satisfied by the property (i.e., the
secured portion of the debt). This alternative is supported by section 506 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which strips down the mortgage and treats as secured only
that portion equal to the fair market value of the property. It is also supported
95 I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1) describes the tax consequences of a transfer at the
commencement of the case "other than by sale or exchange." Thus, if the transfer at the
commencement of the case constitutes an exchange applying the same analysis as that
applied to abandonments, then it would be excepted from I.R.C. § 1398(0(1). See also Ray
D. Madoff, A Reappraisal of the Tax Consequences of Abandonments in Bankruptcy, 50
TAX NoTEs 785, 791 (1991); Nelson, supra note 62, at 233-35; Wallace, supra note 46.
96 There must be "a giving, a receipt, and a causal connection between the two."
Yarbro v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189
(1985). Applying this analysis, of course, assumes that we are ignoring the first problem-
that a recognition event in bankruptcy requires an entitlement-and are applying only
general tax law in determining whether there has been a sale or exchange.
97 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
9 8 Id. § 301.
99 Nelson, supra note 62, at 233; Wallace, supra note 46, at 29.
100 Wallace, supra note 46, at 29.
101 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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by the case law, which defines "sale or exchange" rather broadly. 10 2 Certainly,
there is a causal connection between transferring property to the bankruptcy
estate and relief from mortgage payments and property taxes. Thus, the transfer
at the commencement of the case would constitute an exchange under
nonbankruptey law and would, therefore, be excepted from the tax-free
treatment of section 1398(f)(1). This result is anomalous because, in practice,
section 1398(t)(1) has not been applied in this manner. 103
A third problem with the entrapment theory is the characterization of the
abandonment itself as a sale or exchange. The Internal Revenue Code generally
taxes those dispositions that it deems final. Exceptions to taxation are made
when the new property is substantially a continuation of the old investment.
Thus, the appropriate time for taxation of a gain is upon final disposition of the
property. 1°4 Upon commencement of the bankruptcy case, "the estate shall be
treated as the debtor would be treated with respect to [each] asset," 10 5 and
upon termination of the case, "the debtor shall be treated as the estate would be
treated with respect to [each] asset." 10 6 Thus, the Internal Revenue Code seems
to provide for the continuation of the old investment. Filing a bankruptcy
petition does not change the character or form of investment, nor does
abandonment of property by the trustee in bankruptcy. Therefore, taxation
should be reserved for final disposition of the property, namely foreclosure. 107
A final problem with the entrapment theory is that its main purpose is
undermined by bankruptcy law regarding administrative priorities. As
previously stated, the entrapment theory relies on the premise that the tax be
given administrative priority so that the tax does not pass out of the estate to
102 See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (holding that relief from
obligation to pay taxes and assessments against property constitutes a benefit sufficient to
give rise to an amount realized); see also Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 312
(1983); Yarbro v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 479, 484 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1189 (1985); Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970, 981 (1980).
103 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
104 See, e.g., Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 512 (1941); Commissioner v.
Baertschi, 412 F.2d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 1969); Morco Corp. v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d
245 (2d Cir. 1962); Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir.
1952); Caplan v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 203, 210 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Danenberg v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 370, 385 (1979).
105 I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1) (1988).
106 Id. § 1398(f)(2).
107 Note, however, that the usual situation is distinguishable from In re A.J. Lane. In
that case, foreclosure proceedings (i.e., final disposition) had already commenced when the
trustee abandoned the property. In re A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. 264, 266 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991).
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the debtor at the termination of the case. 108 However, taxes placed upon the
estate for gains on the abandonment of property most likely would not be given
administrative priority. Administrative priority may be given to taxes that are
actual and necessary expenses of preserving the estate109 or taxes incurred by
the estate. 110 We have already determined that abandonment does not fit within
the "incurred by the estate" definition. 111 Thus, for the tax to be considered an
administrative expense, it must constitute an actual and necessary expense of
preserving the estate. The phrase, "actual and necessary," must be narrowly
construed to meet an overriding concern in the Bankruptcy Code: to keep fees
and administrative expenses at a minimum so as to preserve as much of the
estate as possible for the creditors. 112 The courts have devised a two-part test
for determining whether an expense qualifies as an administrative expense: (1)
whether the claim arose postpetition, and (2) whether the debt substantially
benefited the estate.13
Clearly, a tax liability arising from an abandonment arises postpetition.
The question is whether it substantially benefits the estate. The estate is
benefited in that it is relieved of the secured portion of the debt attached to the
property. However, it also gives up the encumbered property that would be
used to pay that debt. As such, there is no net benefit. There may even be a net
loss to the estate if the estate has had to make any mortgage or property tax
payments on the property during the period between the commencement of the
bankruptcy case and the abandonment of the property.
One may also consider the fact that the estate is relieved of the burden of
administering that property. Is this benefit substantial enough to meet the test?
When one considers the overriding concern associated with the section granting
administrative expenses-to keep administrative fees to a minimum 114-it is
unlikely that this benefit is sufficient to qualify the tax as an administrative
108 See supra text accompanying note 76.
109 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
110 Id. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).
I11 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
112 E.g., Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 53 (1974); In re N.P. Mining Co., 963
F.2d 1449, 1453-54 (lth Cir. 1992); In re United Trucking Service, Inc., 851 F.2d 159,
164 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 134 B.R. 482, 488
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 23 B.R. 104, 121 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982). Courts have noted a competing concern in Chapter 11 cases: allowing
essential costs of administering an ongoing business venture to be paid up front to give the
debtor its best shot at emerging as a vital concern. In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d
700, 707 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 452 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
113 E.g., In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 706-07; Wolf Creek Collieries Co. v.
GEX Kentucky, Inc., 127 B.R. 374, 379 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
114 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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expense. Because this tax is a post petition debt, it cannot be given priority
under section 507(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code, 115 nor is it even dischargeable
under section 727(3).116 Therefore, the tax would pass out of the estate to the
debtor upon termination of the estate, thus undermining the overall purpose of
the entrapment theory.
2. The Deflection Theory
a. A Look at the Theory Itself
It has been held for nontax purposes that an abandonment relates back to
the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. In other words, title to the
property reverts back to the debtor and stands as if no transfer to the estate had
been made. 117 The deflection theory relies on this premise for the proposition
that abandonment also relates back to the date of filing for purposes of
taxation.l" 8 Because this theory essentially disregards any transfer made to the
estate upon commencement of the case, abandonment of property back to the
debtor could not give rise to taxable income to the estate. The Bankruptcy
Code does not specify that the abandonment of property is to relate back to the
date of the commencement of the case; however, the Code does not expressly
preclude such a reading."19
b. The Case Lmv Supporting the Deflection Theory
The deflection theory has its roots in the 1937 Supreme Court decision of
Brown v. O'Keefe.120 In that case, the Court held that even though the debtor
filed bankruptcy, he was still the owner of certain shares of stock and,
therefore, not relieved of the liabilities attendant upon such ownership. 121 The
115 Section 507 grants a priority only to those taxes that were assessed, or that related
to a taxable year ending, on or before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(/) (1988).
116 Section 727 grants the debtor a discharge from all debts that arose before
commencement of the bankruptcy case. Id. § 727(b).
117 See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text; see also Mason v. Commissioner,
646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652, 653 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1991); Frankel, supra note 34, at 40-41; Nelson, supra note 62, at 236-40; Wallace, supra
note 46, at 26.
118 See Nelson, supra note 62, at 236-40.
119 See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988).
120 300 U.S. 598 (1937).
121 Id. at 602.
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Court reasoned that upon abandonment of the property, title reverts to the
debtor as of the date the petition was filed, and it "stands as if no assignment
had been made." 122 Therefore, the debtor was treated as the continuous owner
of the stock.
In In re Cruseturner,123 the court held that abandonment of property
revested title in the debtor so as to become "property of the debtor" and thus
subject to the automatic stay protection of section 362(a)(5). 124 In so holding,
the court adopted the precise language written by the Brown Court more than
40 years earlier. 125
In re Bentley126 appears to have been the only case to apply the deflection
theory to a determination of tax liability. In that case, the trustee sold a corn
crop free and clear of any liens for cash and held the proceeds subject to a lien
in favor of the Commodity Credit Corporation. Three years later, the trustee
abandoned the proceeds to the debtor. 127 The court held that the estate was not
liable for the taxes, because the abandonment revested the debtor with all
interests to the property. Thus, the estate was never entitled to the proceeds as
required by section 1398(e) and, therefore, could not be taxed upon them. 128
c. Problems Inherent in the Deflection Theory
The appeal of the deflection theory, which relates the date of abandonment
back to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, lies in its simplicity
and convenience as a tool to achieve desirable results. However, this is where
the theory's usefulness ends. The theory simply has no basis in law.
1'22 Id. (citing Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 52 (1892)).
123 8 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
12 4 Id. at 591-92.
125 Whatever title or inchoate interest may have passed to the trustee was extinguished
by relation as of the filing of the petition when the trustee informed the court that the
shares were burdensome assets, and was directed by the court to abandon and disclaim
them. In such case "the title stands as if no assignment had been made."
Id. at 591 (citing Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602 (1937)).
126 79 B.R. 413 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987), rev'd, 89-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 9597
(S.D. Iowa 1988), aft'd, 916 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1990).
127 Id. at 414-15.
128 Id. at 416. This opinion was reversed because the trustee had converted the corn
crop to cash and exercised complete dominion and control over the proceeds. Because the
trustee had administered this asset, the estate was entitled to the proceeds and, therefore,
should bear the tax burden. In re Bentley, 89-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9597. The court
specifically noted, however, that had the trustee abandoned the corn crop itself to the
debtor, it would have related back, and the tax would have accrued to the debtor. Id.
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The Bankruptcy Code does not mention relating the time of the
abandonment back to the petition's filing date.129 Clearly, legal title to the
debtor's property passes to the estate when the petition is filed.' 30 It is also
clear that legal title passes back to the debtor when the property is
abandoned. 13 1 The deflection theory ignores these transfers, treating them as if
they never occurred. The case law supports characterization of this theory as a
"legal fiction." 132
The theory is especially suspect when one considers that property may be
abandoned to any party with a possessory interest.133 If the trustee decided to
abandon the property to someone other than the debtor with a possessory
interest, then it is very difficult to treat the property as if no bankruptcy has
been filed.
D. Convergence of the Two Theories: Cases Adopting a Middle
Approach
There are two cases that reject the entrapment theory yet do not quite go so
far as to adopt the deflection theory. As such, they are more appropriately dealt
with in a separate section.
In In re McGowan,134 the trustee abandoned certain equipment and
machinery to the debtor because there was no equity in the property and it was
burdensome to the estate. The trustee then filed an application for
determination of tax liability, arguing that the abandonment was a taxable
disposition by the estate. Not surprisingly, the debtor agreed with the
trustee.135
The court held that abandonment of property by the trustee in bankruptcy
is not a sale or exchange that triggers tax liability chargeable to the estate.' 36 In
129 See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988).
130 Id.
131 In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581, 591 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981); KING, supra note 58,
554.02(2); Nelson, supra note 62, at 237.
132 In re Ira Haupt & Co., 398 F.2d 607, 613 (2d Cir. 1968); Wallace v. Lawrence
Warehouse Co., 338 F.2d 392, 394 n.1 (9th Cir. 1964); Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111
F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1940); Barletta v. Tedeschi, 121 B.R. 669, 674 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
133 S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5878;
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 57, at 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6333.
134 95 B.R. 104 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
135 Id. at 105-06. The court expressed concern that in taking this position, the trustee
was more concerned with protecting the postbankruptcy debtor than with acting in the best
interests of the estate. Id.
136 Id. at 108.
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so holding, the court first rejected the debtor's (and the trustee's in this case)
argument that section 1398(f)(2) does not apply to abandonments during the
bankruptcy case, because they do not occur "at the termination of the estate."
The court began its analysis by noting that section 1398(f)(2) does not define
the phrase "termination of the estate" and that the phrase is open to several
interpretations:
This term could mean the closing of a case after full administration of the
estate; a termination of the estate's interest in property by virtue of
abandonment or exemption; the termination of the estate's interest in property
as a result of completed state or federal court proceedings following
modification or termination of the automatic stay if such proceedings terminate
the estate's interests under state law. It could have other meanings.
137
The court stated that "§ 1398(f)(2) was not drafted by Congress with an eye to
bankruptcy terminology" and concluded that the court must define those words
in a bankruptcy context. Then the court, without analysis or reasoning, simply
concluded that "the meaning of 'termination of the estate' includes the
termination of the estate's interest in property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ [sic]
554(a)." 138
The court then rejected the debtor's argument that the estate could not
escape tax consequences under section 1398(f)(2), because the abandonment
constituted a "sale or exchange" under Yarbro.139 In Yarbro, the Fifth Circuit
held that an abandonment of property subject to nonrecourse debt constituted
an exchange resulting in capital loss treatment. 140 In finding that the
abandonment constituted an exchange, the court stated that:
The term "exchange," in its most common, ordinary meaning implies an act of
giving one thing in return for another thing regarded as an equivalent ....
Thus, three things are required: a giving, a receipt, and a causal connection
between the two. In the case of abandonment of property subject to
nonrecourse debt, the owner gives up legal title to the property. The
mortgagee, who has a legal interest in the property, is the beneficiary of this
gift, because the mortgagee's interest is no longer subject to the abandoning
owner's rights. 141
137 Id. at 107.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Yarbro v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 479, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1984), cet. denied, 469
U.S. 1189 (1985).
141 Id. at 483-84.
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The Yarbro court also noted that the taxpayer who abandoned the property
received a benefit in the form of relief from the obligation to pay the debt and
the taxes and assessments against the property, even though the debt was
nonrecourse.
142
The McGowan court, however, refused to apply the Yarbro analysis to
abandonments of property during bankruptcy. The court noted that although the
trustee divests the estate of legal title to the property upon abandonment, the
trustee receives only relief from the obligation to administer the property. The
court did not consider this relief the kind of benefit necessary to constitute an
"exchange." 143
In a very similar case before the same court, the court refused to overrule
In re McGowan.144 In In re Olson, the trustee abandoned to the debtors certain
tracts of land subject to mortgages. The foreclosure proceedings, which had
commenced before bankruptcy, had been stayed upon the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.1 45 The trustee failed to file income tax returns for the
estate, and the debtors prepared returns reporting the gain on the abandonment.
The trustee sought a determination from the court that the estate was not liable
for the taxes arising from the abandonment. 146
The court relied on In re McGowan in holding that the abandonment did
not constitute a sale or exchange that would trigger tax liability chargeable to
the estate. The court first rejected the debtors' argument that the abandonment
constituted an exchange under Yarbro.147 The Olson court, however, went one
step further than the McGowan decision. Not only did the trustee not receive
the sort of benefit necessary for an "exchange," but he also did not give
anything, because he could not transfer title. 148
142 Id. at 484 (citing Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)).
143 In re McGowan, 95 B.R. at 108.
144 In re Olson, 100 B.R. 458 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989), ff'd, 121 B.R. 346 (N.D.
Iowa 1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991). Other courts have adopted the reasoning of
the McGowan and Olson courts. In re Terjen, 154 B.R. 456 (E.D. Va. 1993); In re Burpo,
148 B.R. 918 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993); In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1991); see also Lipton, supra note 13, at 14; Madoff, supra note 95, at 789-91. The
Internal Revenue Service, too, has adopted the conclusion reached in In re McGowan and In
re Olson. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1(d)(1), -2(d)(1); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-17-075 (Apr.
27, 1990).
145 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
146 In re Olson, 100 B.R. at 460.
147 Id. at 462-63.
148 Id. at 463. In In re McGowan, the court recognized the fact that the trustee
divested the estate of title to the property as sufficient to support a "giving" by the trustee.
In re McGowan, 95 B.R. 104, 108 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988). Upon commencement of a
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The court then rejected the debtors' second argument that the abandonment
did not result from the "termination of the estate." The court recognized that
the McGowan decision may have been overbroad in defining "termination of
the estate" and acknowledged that a better definition might be "the closing of
the case." 149 Even adopting this definition of "termination of the estate," the
court still held that abandonment would not give rise to a taxable gain. The
court could see no reason why abandonment during the administration should
have a different tax effect than abandonment by operation of law as a result of
property being unadministered at the close of the case.150
Finally, the court rejected the debtors' argument that shifting the burden of
taxes to the debtor is improper, because it burdens the fresh start policy of the
Bankruptcy Code. The court reasoned that the Chapter 7 debtor is not given a
fresh start from all debts and held that any such concern about damage to the
debtor's fresh start must be addressed by Congress.' 5'
IV. THE PROPER TAX TREATMENT OF ABANDONMENTS
Neither the entrapment nor the deflection theory withstands close scrutiny.
A middle approach such as that adopted in In re McGowan and In re Olson
should be applied. That is, abandonment by a trustee in bankruptcy should not
be considered a sale or exchange giving rise to a taxable gain to the estate as it
is under the entrapment theory. Nor should the existence of the estate be
ignored by relating the date of abandonment back to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition as it is under the deflection theory. However, the reasoning
of the McGowan and Olson courts must not be blindly followed. Although
their conclusions are correct, their reasoning is incomplete and somewhat
flawed.
First, the McGowan court's definition of "termination of the estate" as
including the termination of the estate's interest in property by abandonment 52
was supported by no analysis or reasoning. The court apparently realized its
error in In re Olson and acknowledged that a better definition might be "the
case in bankruptcy, the debtor transfers title in the property to the estate-not the trustee.
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
149 In re Olson, 100 B.R. at 463.
150 Id. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) provides that property unadministered at the close of the
case is abandoned to the debtor by operation of law. I.R.C. § 1398(0(2) provides tax-free
treatment for any transfer of property from the estate to the debtor at the termination of the
estate. It does not exclude transfers by operation of law.
151 In re Olson, 100 B.R. at 464.
152 In re McGowan, 95 B.R. at 107.
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closing of the case." 153 This definition is much more in line with the traditional
definition of "termination." 154 The Olson court went on to conclude that even
though abandonment did not constitute a "termination of the estate" by
definition, the court could see no reason for treating it differently than
abandonment by operation of the law as a result of property being
unadministered at the close of the case.' 55 But the court stopped its discussion
there, offering no reason for its conclusion.
Certainly, there is no substantive difference between abandonment during
bankruptcy and abandonment by operation of law at the close of the case under
section 554(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. In both situations, there is no
administering of the property by the trustee. 156 Furthermore, if abandonment
during bankruptcy were to give rise to taxable income to the estate, the trustee
could simply hold onto the property without administering it until the close of
the bankruptcy case, when the property would revert tax free back to the
debtor. 157 This result would effectively write section 554(a), which gives the
trustee the power to abandon property, out of the Bankruptcy Code-a result
that most likely was not intended by Congress.
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code provides that for state income tax
purposes, "neither gain nor loss shall be recognized on a transfer . . . other
than a sale, of property from the estate to the debtor . ... -158 Thus, an
abandonment of property by a trustee-regardless of whether it occurs in
connection with the termination of the estate-does not trigger gain or loss to
the estate for state income tax purposes, unless the transfer constitutes a true
sale. There is no apparent reason why abandonment of property should have
different consequences for state income tax purposes than for federal income
tax purposes. 159
Second, both the McGowan and the Olson courts specifically declined to
apply the Yarbro analysis to abandonments of property during bankruptcy. The
courts held that although the trustee receives relief from the obligation to
153 In re Olson, 100 B.R. at 463.
154 Termination is defined as an "[e]nd in time or existence; close; cessation;
conclusion." BLACK'S LAWDICrIONARY 1471 (6th ed. 1990).
155 In re Olson, 100 B.R. at 463; see 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1988).
156 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
157 This argument assumes that the court has not ordered the trustee to abandon the
property. 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1988).
158 Id. § 346(g)(1)(B).
159 Wallace, supra note 46, at 27. But see Lipton, supra note 13, at 14; Madoff,
supra note 95, at 78 (both noting that the plain language of I.R.C. § 1398()(2) provides for
nonrecognition of gain or loss only in the case of a "termination of the estate," which does
not include abandonment).
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administer the property, that kind of benefit is not the kind of benefit necessary
to an exchange. 160 The Olson court went even further and held that the other
major requirement for an exchange, the giving, was also absent, because the
trustee could not transfer a title that never vested in him.161
In arriving at this conclusion, the McGowan and Olson courts focused on
the trustee as the exchanging party instead of the estate. However, upon
commencement of the bankruptcy case, title to the debtor's property vests in
the estate-not in the trustee. 162 In addition, the estate-not the trustee-bears
the burden of any tax imposed on the estate. 163 Therefore, it is only logical to
analyze the exchange from the estate's point of view. Instead of twisting the
analysis to take the abandonment out of the scope of Yarbro, the McGowan and
Olson courts should have held that the Yarbro analysis simply does not apply in
a bankruptcy context. In order for a bankruptcy estate to recognize income, it
must be entitled to it. 164 A bankruptcy estate does not become entitled to
income through mere abandonment of property. 165
In short, the McGowan and Olson courts arrived at the proper conclusions,
but the reasoning behind these conclusions must be clarified before using them
as the standard governing the taxation of abandonments in bankruptcy.
Because the Bankruptcy Tax Act does not expressly deal with the tax
treatment of abandonments, 166 some other law must apply. The entrapment
theory mandates that general tax law apply. However, because we are dealing
with a bankruptcy situation, general tax law must be reconciled with
bankruptcy law in determining whether abandonment is a taxable event.
Bankruptcy is a unique situation, which creates two separate taxpayers. As
such, a determination must be made as to which taxpayer is entitled to the
income from the gain on the property. As was previously determined, the estate
is entitled to gross income when the trustee administers the estate. Yet the
trustee is not administering anything by simply abandoning property. 167
Therefore, abandonment cannot give rise to income taxable to the estate.
In addition, consideration must be given to the purposes underlying the
Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code. As noted above, our tax
160 In re Olson, 100 B.R. 458, 462-63 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989), aff'd, 121 B.R. 346
(N.D. Iowa 1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991); In re McGowan, 95 B.R. 104, 108
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
161 In re Olson, 100 B.R. at 463.
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988); In re Robison, 74 B.R. 646, 647 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
163 See supra note 46.
164 I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1) (1988).
165 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
166 See LR.C. § 1398(I(1)-(2) (1988).
167 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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system, based primarily on voluntary assessments, works only to the extent that
taxpayers think it is fair. The overall fairness must not be jeopardized by
permitting taxpayers to use bankruptcy as a means for improperly avoiding
their tax debts. 168 If the tax debt properly belongs to the debtor, the debtor
must not be allowed to force the creditors to bear the burden of that tax debt. In
addition, the Internal Revenue Code generally attempts to postpone taxation
until final disposition of the property.' 69 Such postponement avoids uncertainty
in the tax law and the administrative burden of determining whether a
particular event is taxable on a case-by-case basis.
These purposes must be reconciled with those underlying the Bankruptcy
Code. It is often said that the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to
provide the debtor a fresh start. 170 However, the provision allowing for
abandonment is not intended to benefit the debtor, but rather is intended to
provide for the orderly and efficient reduction of the bankrupt's debts. 171 In
addition, the fresh start policy is not without its limitations. The Chapter 7
debtor is not given a fresh start from all debts. 172 Furthermore, upon
abandonment, the automatic stay is still effective.173 Thus, the debtor still has
time to try to work something out with the creditors in order to attempt to
preserve the debtor's fresh start. 174 Also, unless the stay is lifted by the court,
it will continue in effect until the earliest of the closing of the case, dismissal,
or the granting of a discharge. 175 Thus, by the time foreclosure is permitted,
the debtor will have regained possession of the tax attributes.' 76 Even if the
court lifts the automatic stay, the proposed regulations to section 1398 provide
for the return of two tax attributes-passive activity losses and losses suspended
under the at-risk rules of section 465-to the debtor upon abandonment of
property by a trustee. 177
Keeping these purposes in mind, it seems proper and fair to conclude that
an abandonment is not taxable to the estate, but rather is taxable to the debtor
upon subsequent disposition of the property.
168 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
172 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (1988); see also In re Olson, 100 B.R. 458, 464 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1989), af'd, 121 B.R. 346 (N.D. Iowa 1990), af'd, 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991).
173 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1988); see also In re Shields, 24 B.R. 219, 220 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Bennett, 13 B.R. 643, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981).
174 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c) (reaffirmation), 722 (redemption) (1988).
175 Id. § 362(c)(2).
176 I.R.C. § 13981) (1988).
177 Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1(d)(2)(ii), -2(d)(2), Fed Reg. 53300-02 (1992).
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V. TAX PLANNING STRATEGIES FOR THE DEBTOR
If the conclusion of this Comment is followed, and an abandonment by a
trustee in bankruptcy is taxable to the debtor upon subsequent disposition and
not to the estate, there are certain strategies that a debtor can employ to
mitigate this tax liability.
First, before filing bankruptcy, a debtor may sell, or encourage the
creditors to foreclose upon, any property that is fully encumbered and thus
likely to be abandoned by the trustee in bankruptcy. However, this tax will not
accrue until the end of the calendar year; thus, the tax will be considered a post
petition debt, which is not payable out of the estate. A debtor may, however,
elect to truncate the taxable year on the date of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.' 78 This truncation, in effect, creates two short taxable years, and any
tax liabilities incurred in the first short year become prepetition debts. These
liabilities are transferred to the estate upon commencement of the bankruptcy
case,179 and the tax claim would be entitled to a priority payment from the
funds of the estate.180 While such a debt is nondischargeable if the assets of the
estate are insufficient to pay it, 181 the debtor's chance of avoiding personal
liability for the tax debt is much greater.
Second, as an alternative to shifting the tax liability to the estate, a debtor
may sell any nonexempt assets before filing for bankruptcy, then deposit the
money received with the Internal Revenue Service to cover the estimated tax
payments that would arise upon subsequent disposition of the abandoned asset
by the debtor.' 82
178 I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2); see, e.g., David F.P. O'Connor, Wien the Workout Fails:
Abandonment, Repossession, Foreclosures, and Procedural Considerations, in TAX ASPECrS
OF WORKOUTS, INSOLvENCY, AND BANKRUPTCY 1991, at 229 (ALI-ABA Course of Study
Series No. c701, 1991); Onsager, supra note 12, at 105-06; Ritt & Burke, supra note 34, at
186.
179 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
180 Specifically, this tax claim is entitled to the seventh highest priority. Id.
§ 507(a)C7).
181 Id. § 523(a)(1); see also S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 22, at 24, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7039; H.R. REP. No. 833, supra note 22, at 19.
182 This strategy has been upheld by at least one bankruptcy court. In re Halle, 132
B.R. 186 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (holding that estimated taxes paid by a debtor prepetition
and applied to the debtor's tax liability were not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate




It would have been a simple task for Congress to have included a provision
in the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980183 that governed the tax treatment of
abandonments in bankruptcy. However, Congress, either purposely or
inadvertently, left this issue to judicial interpretation. The courts have not fared
better in resolving the issue. Two theories have emerged, mandating
completely opposite conclusions.
This Comment has analyzed the two theories and has concluded that both
theories are seriously flawed. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Iowa, in two different cases, has adopted a middle approach. The court
concluded that an abandonment by a trustee in bankruptcy does not constitute a
"sale or exchange" that would give rise to a taxable gain to the estate (i.e., it
rejected the entrapment theory). The court did not quite conclude, however,
that for tax purposes, title to the abandoned property reverts back to the debtor,
standing as if no transfer to the estate had occurred (i.e., it did not adopt the
deflection theory). This conclusion is correct, although the court's reasoning is
rather incomplete.
This Comment has attempted to fill the gaps in the McGowan and Olson
court's reasoning and further support the court's reasoning by reconciling the
purposes behind the Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code.
Lisa M. Hebenstreit
183 I.R.C. §§ 1398-1399 (1988).
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